Last summer a snowboarder descending Mt. Baker’s Squak Glacier in the Cascades broke through a snowbridge into a crevasse. Luckily, as he dropped he threw out his arms and was able to bridge the slot and hold himself from an estimated 60-foot plummet. Whew; he’d caught himself but he hung suspended in essentially a crucifix position, helpless. His skiing partner had stopped to watch, saw him go by and then break through, luckily lower down the slope. The skier was able to navigate down across other crevasses to a spot above the fall, then get out a rope to rescue him. The rescuer kept a head camera running as he worked, and he presented the video to the American Alpine Club. Thus we have a rare recording of a live-action crevasse rescue under dire pressure.
The AAC incorporated the video into an instructive video with an analyst. The visuals are understandably fuzzy, but it’s a good case of surface rescue skills in action. Unfortunately the analysis is glaringly inadequate in a way that reflects weaknesses in our practices and culture. You can find this video here: https://americanalpineclub.org/news/2025/12/10/the-prescriptioncrevasse-fall?mc_cid=ad6774c4a5&mc_eid=a6d89de6fc. I watch it with interest because crevasses have written a big score through my life.

For many years I worked as a mountain guide and instructor with Mt. Baker as the home mountain. From my first week I realized that the bread ‘n’ butter job of being roped to novices while going over yawning, variously hidden crevasses required some obsession to play the game well. We Mt. Baker guides refined the protocols for travel and rescue, and when I took that experience onto glaciers around the world I carried a wary confidence that served me reasonably well. Eventually I wrote Glacier Travel and Crevasse Rescue, a how-to manual published through Mountaineers Books. That book became the topic’s standard text, and it has been translated into German and Spanish. The skills I practiced allowed me to save at least one person’s life, and I’ve been told how the book has helped save many others, including my own.

In the Squak Glacier video you can see the rescuer setting a good anchor and sending a rope end with a loop to his hanging partner, who is able to slip his hand through to hold himself marginally better as his buddy continues working. Somehow that’s unexplained the victim gets the loop to his harness. The rescuer then has him on his own harness, but the guy still cannot get out. Somehow also not shown the rescuer shifts the load onto a nicely reinforced anchor. Escaped from the load, he sends down the other rope end and rigs a 3:1 “Z” system to haul him out, all in pretty swift time. Few people deploy crevasse rescue maneuvers very often, but this guy was ready. The AAC analyst points out key aspects and offers a few suggestions, like making a quicker anchor by stabbing a ski or two into the snow, and carrying the rope not coiled but simply stacked in a wrapped tarp for quicker deployment. Anyone who travels on glaciers would do well to watch this video for two reasons: 1) a good example of rescue work under pressure, and 2) noticing how there’s essentially no focus on how the pair’s judgment got them into this near catastrophe and likely tragedy in the first place.
All aspects of mountain excursions–our fun, accomplishments, efficiency and safety–they all come out of our awareness and assessments of the terrain. In general we size up our goals and perceive the risks, we collect a gut feeling for how much of what risks we face, and we dial our security measures to suit norms and those gut feelings. On a glacier the opportunities for travel and the chances of risk depend on the degree of crevassing and the strength of bridging snow. Sometimes crevasses are bridged well enough to offer steady cruising, and sometimes they’re a minefield of weak trap doors practically promising that someone will drop in somewhere. If you know your area, based on the season you can start making educated guesses about the snow and bridge conditions even before you see the mountain. Once there you want to identify the visible crevassing and make guesses for where holes lurk partially or totally hidden. Basically, you want an accurate feel for how much you can trust what’s underfoot. Crevasses form out of tension in the slowly moving ice beneath the snow, and a tensioned convexity is exactly where this snowboarder fell through.
The AAC’s analysis doesn’t address overall judgment, terrain, or roped vs no-rope protocols in any way. There is almost no discussion on what the conditions were, how they likely varied with elevation or time of day, how the guys chose their route, or how they thought it would be good to descend unroped. It also doesn’t address how the snowboarder apparently did not have the gear or skills to ascend the rope out himself, or why that makes for a simpler rescue. They did wear harnesses, a hedge that in most unroped incidents doesn’t help, but in the luck of this case it really paid off. The AAC analyst tells that the rescuer was understandably hurried and uncautious in using a lot of rope and in fact ran out of rope, but that doesn’t make sense because obviously he had enough rope to haul his buddy out. In accompanying text the rescuer does look back with thoughts on what he’d do differently, focusing on better communication with his partners, but he writes nothing about comparing the terrain and conditions with their backup rescue readiness.
Crevasse risks are similar to avalanche risks in that you have to read the integrity of snow, arguably the most dynamic substance on earth, on the fly. You start a read with facts and observations, but you have to run your decisions with a lot of intuition. You bring rescue skills and gear because sooner or later your assessments miss, and you want those backups to match the actual risk you’re willing to take. For avalanches we have a culture of sophisticated yet inherently imperfect science for predicting slope failures and setting protocols for travel, and every significant avalanche incident gathers an analysis of all contributing aspects. Not so for crevasse hazards, and until we look at the problem more carefully the slots are as dismissed in our minds as they are hidden on the mountain. Maybe most importantly, rescue skills do not make us safe.
Nobody with common sense thinks they are safe from avalanches because they wear beacons and know how to search for buried partners. Here, the rescuer’s own retrospection points out a case of slipping into careless confidence because he had previous uneventful descents of Mt. Baker and because he knew how to set up a haul system. He also realized that if he had been the one to punch through his less experienced partner likely wouldn’t have been able to help. Especially he said, “I was too caught up in having fun and skiing,” to pay close attention to the terrain and how to descend it.
It’s too common in our culture to look to technical tools and skills to create our opportunities and to get us out of our problems. In this case technical skills did save the guy, but more important was luck. If that crevasse had been even inches wider they would be telling a different tale. The rescuer also notes that there were other parties around who might have helped if they’d needed it, and this points to the “heuristics” that avalanche scientists study–especially how we can be deluded into imagining safety simply because other people are around. As a guide, stepping and leaping across deep, semi-hidden crevasses while roped to novices screams out how vulnerable I am–dependent on my imperfect judgment of snow and thereby dependent on teammates for backup–more than in belayed rock climbing.
The vision I like to take into the mountains wraps fun, accomplishments, techniques and safety within a sense of resonance. More than anything I relish and rely on accurate resonance with the terrain. The gut feelings at the root of our game depend on how accurately we read terrain and its dynamics. I speak from experience to say that it’s awful to discover that your sense of well being has been a delusion, and sooner or later probably every adventurer finds that lesson. When we carry out a trip that resonates with great terrain it’s a correspondingly great feeling, including the times when we add more backup or simply back off because things are just not right. Resonance as a focus calls for dynamic asking; what’s ahead, what’s above, what’s waiting on the way down, what’s underfoot, and how ready are we really?
To me, a plan to ski or ride down a crevassed glacier unroped starts with an acceptance that we’ll be taking trap-door risks with little or no viable backup–and from that understanding our gut usually tells us to mitigate. As skiers and riders we can mitigate by climbing up roped together, scouting the route for our descent, identifying crevassed areas where we might put the rope back on, and adding a hedge for how snowbridges weaken as a day warms. In my book I really emphasize the process for assessing conditions and finding routes because avoiding falls into crevasses is 1000% safer and more satisfying than falling in.













































